Abstract XML is rapidly emerging as a standard for data representation and exchange over the World Wide Web and an increasing amount of sensitive business data is processed in XML format. Therefore, it is critical to have control mechanisms to restrict a user to access only the parts of XML documents that she is authorized to access. In this paper, we propose the first DTD-based access control model that employs graph matching to analyze if an input query is fully acceptable, fully rejectable, or partially acceptable. In this way, there will be no further security overhead for the processing of fully acceptable and rejectable queries. For partially acceptable queries, we propose a graph-matching based authorization model for an optimized rewriting procedure in which a recursive query (query with descendant axis '//') will be rewritten into an equivalent recursive one if possible and into a non-recursive one only if necessary, resulting queries that can fully take advantage of structural join based query optimization techniques. Moreover, we propose an index structure for XML element types to speed up the query rewriting procedure, a facility that is potentially useful for applications with large DTDs. Our performance study results showed that our algorithms armed with rewriting indexes are promising.
Introduction
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) (W3C 2006a) is rapidly emerging as a standard for data representation and exchange over the Web. As a result, the problem of secure querying of XML documents becomes more and more important, particularly in business, in which it is critical to protect various trading and financial information and to ensure that sensitive business information can be accessed by only users who are authorized to access them.
Numerous access control models have been proposed for secure querying of XML documents (Damiani et al. 2002; Gabillon and Bruno 2001; Kudo and Hada 2000; Miklau and Suciu 2003; Wang and Osborn 2004; Diao et al. 2003; Luo et al. 2004; Murata et al. 2003; Qi et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2002; Cho et al. 2002; Fan et al. 2004 ). These models can be largely classified into two categories: XPath-based access control models (Damiani et al. 2002; Gabillon and Bruno 2001; Kudo and Hada 2000; Miklau and Suciu 2003; Wang and Osborn 2004; Diao et al. 2003; Luo et al. 2004; Murata et al. 2003; Qi et al. 2005) and DTD-based access control models (Yu et al. 2002; Cho et al. 2002; Fan et al. 2004) . While the former is applicable to XML documents with or without schema information, the latter is particulary appealing when the DTDs (Document Type Definition) (W3C 2006a) or XML Schemas (W3C 2004) for XML documents are available since access control policies can be naturally integrated with the structure of XML documents.
To understand DTD-based access control models better and motivate our research, consider the following example: Suppose in a university, the transcript information of all students is stored as XML documents that conform to the DTD shown in Fig. 1a . Each production rule in the DTD describes for each parent element type, all its children element types, their cardinality (* for zero or many, ? for zero or one, and + for one or many), and the order of the children. For example, the second production rule in Fig. 1a says that each Transcript element contains one Person element, followed by History element, and then followed by an optional TestResult element. An instance of XML document that conforms to this DTD is sketched in Fig. 1b omitting the contents of Person, History, and TestResult for brevity. A DTD can be viewed as a DTD graph in which nodes represent element types and edges represent parent-child relationships. Figure 1c shows the DTD graph corresponding to the DTD in Fig. 1a . Finally, based on the DTD, an access control policy for a group of users can be specified by associating edges in the document DTD graph with security annotations including 'Y', 'N', or an XPath qualifier '[q]' corresponding to accessible, inaccessible, and conditionally accessible element types, respectively. For example, one possible access control policy is specified in Fig. 1d , which imposes the following restrictions to access:
1. To access the transcript information of a student, the user has to be from the same department that the student is majored in. 2. The user cannot access a student's SSN. 3. The user cannot access a student past majored program. 4. The user cannot access the information of a student regarding the courses she has taken. 5. The user cannot access student's test result information.
Although several DTD-based access control models (Cho et al. 2002; Fan et al. 2004; Yu et al. 2002) have been proposed, there is a lack of query analysis technique that can decide if an input query is fully acceptable, fully rejectable, or partially acceptable. Such a technique will enable the elimination of further overhead for the processing of fully acceptable and fully rejectable queries. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1. We propose the first DTD-based access control model that employs graph matching to analyze if an input query is fully acceptable, fully rejectable, or partially acceptable. In this way, there will be no further security overhead for the processing of fully acceptable and rejectable queries. 2. For partially acceptable queries, we propose a graph-matching based authorization model for an optimized rewriting procedure in which a recursive query (query with descendant axis '//') will be rewritten into an equivalent recursive one if possible and into a non-recursive one only if necessary; this enables resulting queries to fully take advantage of structural join based query optimization techniques. 3. We propose to use an index structure for XML element types to speed up the query rewriting procedure, such that a last test node in an XPath query can be efficiently substituted with an entry from the rewriting index. Our performance study results showed that our algorithms armed with rewriting indexes are promising.
This work extends our workshop paper (Chang et al. 2007 ) with the formalization and comprehensive description of our proposed access control model, additional illustrative examples, and the performance study of our proposed algorithms to derive an authorization model for a security specification graph and to analyze and rewrite an XPath query into a secure XPath query.
Organization The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of related work on XML access controls. Section 3 reviews Document Type Definitions and XPath queries. Section 4 describes how access control policies are specified in our access control model. Section 5 deals with security enforcement and presents algorithms to derive an authorization model and to perform XPath query analysis and rewriting. Section 6 presents our performance study and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related work
Numerous access control models for XML documents have been proposed to restrict a user to access only the XML elements that she/he is authorized to access. According to the specification scheme of access control policies, existing models can be classified into two categories: XPath-based access control models (Damiani et al. 2002; Gabillon and Bruno 2001; Kudo and Hada 2000; Miklau and Suciu 2003; Wang and Osborn 2004; Diao et al. 2003; Luo et al. 2004; Murata et al. 2003; Qi et al. 2005) and DTD or XML Schema based access control models (Yu et al. 2002; Cho et al. 2002; Fan et al. 2004 ). An XPath-based access control model uses XPath expressions to specify the XML elements that a user is allowed or denied to access. Therefore, in such model, each access control policy is specified by a set of XPath based grant or denial rules. One advantage of using XPath for the specification of access control policies is that XPath is a standard XML query language with well-defined syntax and semantics. In the meanwhile, a DTD-based access control model uses DTD security annotations to specify the XML element types that a user is allowed or denied to access. One limitation of DTD-based access control models is that they require that the DTDs of XML documents are available, which might not always be the case. In the absence of XML schema information, an XPath-based access control model can be used.
Another dimension of classification is the enforcement mechanism of access control policies. Using this dimension, XML access control models can be classified into two major categories: document-basedenforcement models and query-based-enforcement models. While a document-based-enforcement model (Damiani et al. 2002; Bertino et al. 2001 Gabillon and Bruno 2001; Kudo and Hada 2000; Miklau and Suciu 2003; Yu et al. 2002; Wang and Osborn 2004; Diao et al. 2003; Gabillon 2005; Stoica and Farkas 2002; Cuppens et al. 2005 Cuppens et al. , 2007 Duong and Zhang 2008; Sasaki et al. 2008; Kocatürk and Gündem 2008; Finance et al. 2005; Bouganim et al. 2004 ) enforces access control policies by either preprocessing XML documents into secure views or postprocessing query results to filter out inaccessible information, a querybased-enforcement model (Luo et al. 2004; Murata et al. 2003; Qi et al. 2005; Cho et al. 2002; Fan et al. 2004; Kuper et al. 2005; Byun and Park 2006; Mohan et al. 2005 Mohan et al. , 2007 Damiani et al. 2008 ) rewrites a user query q into a secure query q using the information of access control policies and then evaluates q over the original documents, which returns all and only those XML elements among the query result of q that the user is authorized to access. For the document preprocessing approach, which is also called materialized view based approach in the literature, XML documents are preprocessed so that for each group of users, a view that consists of only accessible elements is calculated in advance. During execution, each query presented by the user is evaluated over the materialized view rather then over the original XML document. The advantage of this approach is efficient query processing as each query can be processed over the view without any further special consideration of policy enforcement. However, the disadvantage is that in a dynamic environment, in which XML documents and access control policies change frequently, the materialization and maintenance of views are computationally expensive. The first materialized view based approach was proposed by Damiani et al. (2000) . On the other hand, for the document postprocessing approach, a query is evaluated over the original documents first, special care is taken to remove those XML elements that are not accessible according to the access control policies, and finally, only those XML elements that the user is authorized to access are returned to the user. The advantage of this approach is that the postprocessing procedure can dynamically reflect the change of access control policies. However, the postprocessing procedure can become the performance bottleneck when the intermediate query result contains large volume of unauthorized XML elements. More seriously, the postprocessing approach might not always guarantee security as the user is permitted to check conditions on XML elements that they are not authorized to access (no security check is performed during query evaluation) and is able to infer information regarding these inaccessible elements, leading to a security leak. An example of such a security leak is illustrated in (Cho et al. 2002) .
In this paper, we propose an XML access control that falls under a DTD-based and query-basedenforcement categories. In particular, in our approach, access control policies are specified as security annotations over DTDs and XML queries are rewritten into secure queries. While there have been proposed a number of query rewriting techniques (e.g., DFA-based Damiani et al. 2008 and NFA-based Luo et al. 2004 query rewriting techniques), our approach stands out by using a graph matching based authorization model for rewriting. Most related to our work is the security view approach proposed by Fan et al. (2004) . In this approach, an access control policy for a group of users is specified by associating elements types in the document DTD with security annotations including 'Y', 'N', or an XPath qualifier '[q]' corresponding to accessible, inaccessible, and conditionally accessible elements, respectively. A view DTD is then calculated automatically which includes only accessible data w.r.t. the access control policy and is provided to the users authorized by the policy to formulate queries over the DTD view. Each query formulated by an authorized user over the DTD view is rewritten to an equivalent query over the original DTD, which is further optimized and then executed. The returned result consists of only XML elements that the user is authorized to access according to the access control policy. Although we use the same DTD annotation language proposed by Fan et al. (2004) for the specification of access control policies, our framework differs from and improves over (Fan et al. 2004 ) in a number of ways for security enforcement. First, instead of only exposing a view DTD, we expose the full original DTD to all users supporting the argument that the availability of the original DTD is critical for interoperability and correctness of business applications (Damiani et al. 2002; Luo et al. 2004; Murata et al. 2003; Qi et al. 2005) . Second, while in Fan et al. (2004) , rewriting is needed for each input query, we introduce a graph matching based static analysis technique to determine if an input query is fully acceptable, fully rejectable, or partially acceptable. Rewriting is necessary only for partially acceptable queries. Although similar static analysis technique has been proposed by Murata et al. (2003) , to our best knowledge, we are the first to propose the static analysis technique for DTD-based access control models. Third, while in (Fan et al. 2004) , each recursive query (query with descendant axis '//') will be rewritten into an equivalent non-recursive one which can be very complex and inefficient, our rewriting procedure only does so when necessary and thus leaves more space for XML query optimization techniques that are applicable to recursive axes (Atay et al. 2007) . Finally, we propose to use an index structure for XML element types to speed up the query rewriting procedure, such that a last test node in an XPath query can be efficiently substituted with an entry from the rewriting index.
Finally, our work is related to the secure XML broadcasting problem Kundu and Bertino 2008; Ko et al. 2007 ; Lee and Whang 2006) where the focus is the secure dissemination of XML documents to authorized users. In these frameworks, besides access controls, encryption and decryption methods are frequently used for the protection of information leaking in communication channels.
Preliminaries
In the following, we review Document Type Definitions (DTDs) (W3C 2006a) and XPath (W3C 2006b) queries considered in this paper.
Document type definition
A DTD document consists of a set of declarations that describe a class of XML documents in terms of constraints on the structure of those XML documents. Similarly to Fan et al. (2004) , we formalize a DTD document or simply a DTD as follows.
A DTD D is a triple (Ele, P, root), where Ele is a finite set of element types; root is a distinguished type in Ele, called the root type; and P is a function that defines the element types, such that for any A in Ele, P(A) is a regular expression of the form:
where str denotes PCDAT A, is the empty word, B i is an element type in Ele that is referred to as a subelement type of A; '*', '+' and '?' denote 'zero or many', 'one or many' and 'zero or one' occurrences of the subelement type under the element type, respectively; ',' and '∨' denote concatenation and disjunction, respectively. We refer to A → γ or A → P(A) as the production of A. A DTD D can be represented as a directed graph, referred to as a DTD graph G D of D. The graph contains a node for each element type A in D, referred to as the A node, and the edges depict the parentchild relationships among the nodes. Specifically, for each production A → γ , there is an edge from the A node to the B node for each element type B in γ . If γ = B * , γ = B+, or γ = B?, then the edge has a '*' (zero or many), '+' (one or many) or '?' (zero or one), respectively, as a label indicating how many B elements can be immediately nested within an A element. When it is clear from the context, we shall use the DTD and its graph interchangeably, referred to as D and G D , respectively; similarly for A element type and A node.
In this paper, we assume that a DTD D is nonrecursive, such that P(A) contains no A directly or indirectly, and thus a DTD graph G D has no cycles.
A sample DTD and its DTD graph are shown in Fig. 1a and b, respectively.
Note that while we choose to use DTD as our XML schema language for the simplicity of presentation, our research is valid for XML Schema as well. Semantically, XML Schema (W3C 2004) and DTD (W3C 2006a) provide similar constructs for describing XML document structures, although XML Schema provides the following additional enhancements: (1) XML Schema provides a richer data type system; (2) XML Schema supports namespaces; and (3) XML Schema supports more complex constraints, such as cardinality constraints. However, all these enhancements are orthogonal to the access control model proposed in this paper. Therefore, our technique is readily applicable to XML Schema as well.
XPath queries
In this paper, we use the same class of XPath (W3C 2006b) queries as defined by Fan et al. (2004) in the following:
where , l, and * denote the empty path, a label (in Ele), and a wildcard, respectively; '∪', '/' and '//' stand for union, child-axis and descedant-or-sel f (or recursive)-axis, respectively; and finally, q in p[q] is called a quali f ier and defined by :
where c is a constant, p is as defined above, and '∨', '∧' and '¬' denote disjunction, conjunction and negation. XPath expressions are commonly used in XML query languages to access specific parts of an XML document. For example, the XQuery (W3C 2007) language uses XPath to retrieve XML data and supplements additional operations, such as projection and join, to further process this data. Therefore, from the security perspective, an access control is required for XPath expressions, while additional operations can be performed on already secure data resulted from XPath evaluation.
Security specification
Our role-based access control for XML documents treats each XML element as an object to which access is controlled by the corresponding access control policies on a DTD. In this section, we formalize how to specify a user access request and access control policy in our model.
In order to access XML data, a user submits an access request to a system as formalized in the following.
Definition 1 (Access Request) An access request ar from a user is a triple (r, D, q), where -r is a role of the user, -D is a DTD of XML documents that the user requests to access, -q is an XPath query that the user uses to access XML data.
Example 1 (Access request for Transcripts.dtd) An access request from a secretary in a computer science department, who wants to collect all student names in the department from the transcripts XML dataset (see Fig. 1 To specify an access control policy for a role we use the notion of a security specification S, which extends a DTD D by associating security annotations with productions of D. More formally, we define a security specification as follows.
Definition 2 (Security Specification) A security specification S is a tuple (r, D, ann), where:
-r is a role in a system, -D is a DTD of XML documents, -ann is a partial mapping from an element type A in Ele and its subelement type B in P(A) to a security annotation α, which we concisely denote as A Additionally, we define a security specif ication graph G S as a DTD graph with security annotations on its edges as defined in S. When it is clear from the context, we shall use the security specification and its security specification graph interchangeably, referred to as S and G S , respectively.
Example 3 (Security specification graph for Transcripts.dtd) The security specification graph G S for the security specification S defined in Example 2 is shown in Fig. 1d Finally, we introduce the notions of accessible XML element and secure query in our model. Definition 3 (Accessible XML Element) Given an XML instance T of a DTD D, an element e in T is accessible w.r.t. a security specification S if and only if either (1) the security annotation for e is Y or [q] and the qualifier [q] is true at e, and, moreover, for all ancestors a of e whose security annotation is [q ], the qualifier [q ] is true at a; or (2) the security annotation for e is not explicitly defined but the parent of e is accessible w.r.t. S. Definition 4 (Secure Query) Given an XML instance T of a DTD D, a query q is secure w.r.t. a security specification S if all the elements returned by the execution of query q over T are accessible.
Security enforcement
A security specification must be enforced for a user query. Our security enforcement mechanism includes the following two steps:
1. Deriving authorization model from security specification graph. 2. XPath query analysis and rewriting.
These steps are elaborated in the following two subsections.
Deriving authorization model
To efficiently enforce an access control policy defined by a security specification, we derive authorization model from a security specification graph G S . Our model requires the notion of accessible and inaccessible nodes, such that an accessible node is a node with all incoming edges annotated with 'Y' and an inaccessible node is a node with all incoming edges annotated with 'N'. The definition of our authorization model is as follows.
Definition 5 (Authorization Model) An authorization model A is a tuple (G A , P t , I i , I a ), where G A is an authorization graph, P t is a predicate table, I i and I a are rewriting indexes for inaccessible and accessible nodes, respectively. Authorization graph G A is a fully annotated security specification graph, derived from security specification graph G S , such that every edge in G A is annotated with 'Y' or 'N', every node in G A is classified as accessible or inaccessible node and inaccessible leaf nodes are recursively pruned. Predicate table P t is a set of tuples, such that each tuple (e, p) relates an edge e in G A and its predicate p. Rewriting index I i (I a ) is a hash table that for each inaccessible (accessible) node n in G A , contains an XPath query q that retrieves all accessible information under n.
The algorithm, deriveAuthorizationModel, to derive an authorization model from a security specification graph G S is presented in Fig. 2 The algorithm deriveAuthorizationGraph is presented in Fig. 3. First (lines 05-06) , the algorithm copies security specification graph G S to authorization graph G A and creates a virtual parent r of G A 's root r and edge r Y − → r, since the root is always considered as accessible. Second (lines 07-10), it creates predicate table P t by placing edges and their corresponding predicates in the table and replaces all predicate annotations with 'Y' annotations in G A . Third (lines 11-38), the algorithm fully annotates G A , such that when node n in G A with all incoming edges annotated and at least one outgoing edge with no annotation is found, the algorithm proceeds depending on the following three cases: In other words, the incoming edges are split between n and n , such that n retains edges with 'Y' annotations and n adopts edges with 'N' annotations. The outgoing edges are retained by n with empty annotations replaced with 'Y' and the same edges are copied for n , but empty annotations are replaced with 'N'. Note that in the following we denote nodes n and n as an accessible node and an inaccessible node with the same label n.
Case 1 (lines 13-27). If node n has incoming edges with both 'Y' and 'N' annotations, then n is cloned to a new node n , n's incoming edges with 'N' annotations

Case 2 (lines 28-32).
If all n's incoming edges are annotated with 'Y', then all outgoing edges with empty annotations are annotated with 'Y'. The same lines 13-27 also split nodes that end up having their all incoming and outgoing edges annotated, such that two distinct incoming edges have different annotations. After all edges are annotated, G A may still have leaf nodes that have incoming edges with both 'N' and 'Y' annotations because the algorithm does not split leaf nodes. Such leaves cannot be classified as accessible (only 'Y' annotations on incoming edges) or inaccessible (only 'N' annotations on incoming edges), which is resolved in the following pruning step. Fourth (lines 39-45), the algorithm simplifies fully annotated G A by recursively removing incoming edges of leaf nodes with 'N' annotations and pruning leaf nodes whose all incoming edges have been removed. After this simplification, G A only has accessible and/or inaccessible nodes, while all leaf nodes are accessible. Fifth (lines 46-48), leaf nodes of G A that are not also leaf nodes in G S are recursively removed (even though they are accessible) because they bear no useful information. Therefore, G A preserves all the paths of G S to accessible leaf nodes, while having precise differentiation between accessible and inaccessible nodes. Finally (line 49), G A and P t are returned.
The algorithm createRewritingIndexes that creates rewriting indexes I i and I a is shown in Fig. 4 . First (line 05), createRewritingIndexes creates the I a index entries for every leaf node. Since all leaf nodes are accessible and have no children, the corresponding queries retrieve the XML instances of these nodes. Then (lines 06-17), it creates index entries for the other nodes, processing nodes whose all children already have entries, until all nodes have the entries. This order allows reusing the previously computed index entries and thus simplifies the algorithm (e.g., we had a recursive algorithm originally) and saves computations. To create a query index entry for an accessible (inaccessible) node n, the algorithm computes the union of queries of the form "/n" + p + I a (c i ) or "/n" + p + I i (c i ) for each accessible or inaccessible child c i of n and assigns it to I a(i) (n), where p is a predicate for edge n − → c i ∈P t if any. Note that a predicate n − → c i ∈P t specifies an access to c i and thus, may include XPath paths relative to c i ; in this case, the algorithm changes such paths to be relative to n by adding "./c i " in front of each relative path. In summary, given node n, which can be accessible or inaccessible, its index entry retrieves all accessible/secure information under n.
Note that an authorization model, similarly to a security specification, is only constructed once for a particular user role. The authorization model for a role is later used to analyze and rewrite any XPath query issued by a user with this role.
Example 4 (Authorization model) Given the security specification graph G S in Fig. 1d, algorithm deriveAu Fig. 5a , where all the nodes are accessible (have 'Y' annotations on their all incoming edges), except for the rectangle node Major that is inaccessible. -It does not perform any action based on lines 46-48, since all leaf nodes in G A (see Fig. 5a ) are also leaves in G S (see Fig. 1d ). -It returns G A and P t as shown in Fig. 5 .
The createRewritingIndexes algorithm takes newly computed G A and P t , and computes indexes I i and I a . Since all the leaves are accessible, each one is added to I a , e.g., I a (Dept) = /Dept, I a (Prog) = /Prog, and so forth. Then, for each node, whose all children are indexed, the algorithm computes its index entry by taking the union of all the paths from the node to its children. For example, for accessible node Major, I a (Major) = /Major/Dept ∪ /Major/Prog and, for inaccessible node Major , I i (Major) = /Major/Dept; note that there is only one inaccessible node in the graph and thus I i has only one entry. The algorithm continues to generate index entries in a similar fashion until all the nodes have entries in I i or I a . The predicate table is used to insert predicates into XPath expressions that are found on the path from a node to a leaf. Some more complex index entries generated by the algorithm are shown in Fig. 5b .
XPath query analysis and rewriting
Given a user query and a precomputed authorization model, the final step of our security enforcement mechanism is to analyze and rewrite the query into a secure XPath query that can retrieve only authorized XML data. To achieve this goal, we design algorithm enforceSecurity as shown in Fig. 6 . The rewriting indexes I a and I i greatly simplify this task since they already contain secure XPath queries for the last (output) test node of the user query. Our algorithm employs the notion of XPath query graph which is derived from a DTD and contains the set of all possible paths for the user query in any valid XML document that conforms to the DTD. To construct an XPath query graph, we use the GetXPGraph algorithm proposed by Bottcher and Steinmetz (2003) . Note that predicates in a user query are different from predicates in an authorization model. The predicates in XPath query are used as edge labels in the XPath query graph. The availability of such a graph allows us to efficiently match it with the authorization graph to determine user accessible information.
Fig. 6 Algorithm enforceSecurity
The input of the enforceSecurity algorithm includes an authorization model (G A , P t , I i , I a ), a DTD graph G D and a user XPath query q. The output is a secure (rewritten) query that may be empty if q only asks for XML data that is not authorized by G A . First (lines 05-06), the algorithm analyzes if the last node test τ (q) in q is not a "*" and τ (q) is not in I a or I i . In other words, τ (q) should be an element name and should not appear in G A since all G A 's nodes have entries in the indexes. If this is the case, q must be simply rejected and the empty ø value must be returned. Second (lines 07-08), the algorithm constructs XPath query graph G q . Third (lines 09-11), since G q may have many leaf nodes (e.g., when τ (q) is a "*"), the algorithm analyzes if none of the leaves have entries in the indexes, then the query must be rejected. Fourth (lines 12-13), if all the leaves in G q are leaves in G D and G A (and leaves of G A are always accessible), and there are no predicates in P t to be inserted in the query, q is fully acceptable query and returned as it is, without rewriting. Fifth (line 14), it constructs the intersection graph of G q and G A , such that all nodes and edges that are in both G q and G A are copied to a new graph G q preserving the predicate labels on G q 's edges. Due to the intersection, G q may have leaf nodes that are not leaves in G q , and must be recursively removed from G q (line 15). Note that G q can not be empty, otherwise we would have exited the algorithm in line 11. Finally (lines 17-31), after the above simple query analysis and the construction of the intersection graph, the algorithm proceeds with the rewriting of the query since at least partial information is accessible to the user:
-If G q has only one leaf l and no edge in G q has a predicate entry in P t , then the algorithm accepts the query (lines 17-20). τ (q) is replaced with the corresponding index entry for l (note that τ (q) can be a "*") that ensures that only authorized results will be retrieved by q. Since G A may have accessible and inaccessible nodes with the same label l, the algorithm decides what index(es) to use based on the paths from the root to l in G q and G A . After the replacement, the query is returned. -Otherwise, if G q has multiple leaves (in this case, each leaf requires a unique replacement from the indexes) or G q 's edges have predicates in P t (in this case the predicates must be added to the query), the algorithm performs the query rewriting (lines 21-31). The rewriting requires the enumeration of all paths in G q , replacing leaves (last node tests) with the index(es) entries and adding predicates from P t to corresponding nodes. The union of the obtained queries (paths) is returned as a secure query.
In the following, we provide a detailed example of how enforceSecurity works for three sample XPath queries.
Example 5 (Query analysis and rewriting) Given the authorization model (G A , P t , I i , I a ) computed in Example 4, DTD graph G D in Fig. 1c, we Query q 3 is partially acceptable with rewriting (line 30). The algorithm computes XPath query graph G q 3 for q 3 (line 07); the graph is shown in Fig. 7 . 
Performance study
This section reports the performance experiments conducted using our deriveAuthorizationModel, deriveAuthorizationGraph, createRewritingIndexes and enforceSecurity algorithms. In the following, we describe our experimental setup, datasets, test queries, and three experiments.
Experimental setup All the algorithms were implemented in Java. To evaluate XPath queries over sample XML documents, we used the X-Hive/DB 8.1.2 system (X-Hive 2008) . The experiments were conducted on a PC with one 1.7 GHz Pentium M CPU and 512 MB of main memory operated by MS Windows XP Professional. To measure algorithm running time, we ran each algorithm for 10 or more times and took the mean of these trails.
Datasets We used two DTDs in our experiments:
(1) the transcript DTD Transcripts.dtd presented throughout the paper and (2) the auction DTD auction.dtd from the XMark benchmark (Schmidt et al. 2002) . The DTD graph of Transcripts.dtd was rather simple with 22 nodes and 23 edges. The DTD graph of auction.dtd was more complicated with over 200 nodes and edges after the removal of several recursive edges, since our algorithms required an acyclic DTD graph. The security specification for trancripts.dtd was as defined in Fig. 1d . The security specification for auction.dtd allowed the access to a closed auction only to the winner of the auction (closed_auctions To evaluate XPath queries over sample XML documents, we used two XML documents: (1 
XPath queries
Time (ms)
Our rewriting procedure Fan's rewriting procedure
These queries were carefully selected, such that their rewriting with algorithm enforceSecurity results in the same secure queries as the ones that can be obtained with the rewriting procedure by Fan et al. (2004) . All the test queries were partially acceptable and required rewriting. In case of fully acceptable or fully rejectable queries, our algorithm enforceSecurity gave its response instantly.
Experiment 1-derivation of an authorization model
In this experiment, we derived the authorization models for the security specification graphs of Transcripts.dtd and auction.dtd. The results are shown in Table 1 . The construction of the models using algorithm deriveAuthorizationModel that called deriveAuthorizationGraph and createRewritingIndexes took less than one sec. The algorithms performed the fastest on the graph of Transcripts.dtd, since it was significantly smaller than the graph of auction.dtd. Note that the authorization model derivation was required to be performed only once for a particular security specification (or a user role). Thus, it did not influence the query response time in the following experiments.
Experiment 2-query analysis and rewriting We used the enforceSecurity algorithm to analyze and rewrite 10 test XPath queries listed above into their secure counterparts. In addition, we compared the performance of our algorithm with the performance of the rewriting algorithm presented by Fan et al. (2004) . In both implementations, for a fair comparison, we did not apply evaluation optimization (Fan et al. 2004) , even though it can be beneficial and can be performed for both approaches. The results of our performance comparison are shown in Fig. 8 . For queries Q1 and Q2, running times for both algorithms were the same, because these queries retrieved XML leaf nodes and thus, the substitutions from our rewriting indexes did not speed-up query rewriting. On the other hand, our rewriting procedure showed to be much faster for queries Q3 through Q10, because our approach rewrote those queries by just referencing rewriting indexes, while Fan's approach rewrote the same queries by collecting all accessible paths in a DTD. Experiment 3-secure XML query evaluation To explore the effect of our approach to secure XML querying on the query response time, we stored XML document Transcripts.xml of size 256 KB and XML document auction.xml of size 10 MB into the X-Hive/DB system and measured both rewriting and evaluation performances for our test queries. While the rewriting procedure showed to have significant effect on overall query response time (see Fig. 9a ) for the smaller XML document, such effect was inconsiderable for the larger XML document (see Fig. 9b ), since query evaluation time was much larger than query rewriting time.
Conclusions and future work
As XML becomes the most common data representation over the World Wide Web, we need effective and efficient access control mechanisms to restrict a user to access only the parts of XML documents according to his/her authorized access right. To address this requirement, there exist several DTD-based XML access control models, however, there is a lack of query analysis technique that can decide if an input query is fully acceptable, fully rejectable, or partially acceptable. Such a technique will enable the elimination of further overhead for the processing of fully acceptable and fully rejectable queries. In this paper, we proposed the first DTD-based access control model that employs graph matching to analyze if an input query is fully acceptable, fully rejectable, or partially acceptable. In this way, there will be no further security overhead for the processing of fully acceptable and rejectable queries. For partially acceptable queries, we proposed an optimized rewriting procedure in which a recursive query is rewritten into an equivalent recursive one if possible and into a non-recursive one only if necessary, resulting queries that can fully take advantage of structural join based query optimization techniques. Finally, we proposed an index structure for XML element types to speed up the query rewriting procedure. Our performance study results showed that our algorithms armed with rewriting indexes are promising. Recently, XML has also become the de facto standard for scientific datasets used in scientific workflow environments (Hastings et al. 2005; Moreau et al. 2005 ). In such environments, a scientist is usually only willing to share one portion of her datasets to some particular workflow task under a particular project context (e.g., permissions are given only to a particular role of users and only for a particular workflow run), there is a great need for an access control for scientific workflows that is fine-grained not only at the subject side: workflows, tasks, ports, and data channels, but also at the dataset side: parent data elements, child elements, and descendant elements. To facilitate and control the secure sharing and access of XML-based scientific datasets in scientific workflow environments, we will extend the access control mechanism proposed in this paper towards scientific workflow environments.
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